The DoD Installation Energy Test Bed sought innovative approaches to obtaining Authority To Operate (ATO) for common current and future network-reliant facility energy control systems and devices. Demonstrations were required to satisfy the requirements established in the Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 8500.01, Cybersecurity, and DoDI 8510.01, Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DoD Information Technology and any applicable Service-specific requirements. DoD sought solutions that resulted in Type Authorization1 (TA) and Reciprocity2 and/or could have easily been replicated by installation personnel responsible for this activity.
Demonstration projects with the following characteristics were preferable:
- High likelihood of achieving reciprocity between Services
- High calculable energy savings, in addition to cost savings, as a direct result of the technology
- Minimal design and engineering required for deployment of the technology after the demonstration (e.g., development of pre-filled standard RMF TA submittal templates)
- Identification of common and mismatched security controls across different Platform Enclaves
- Development of cost factors and metrics to demonstrate scalability of the solution
- Low cost to implement after the demonstration
- Cost sharing
Project teams were encouraged to include representatives from each of the Services to ensure broad acceptance of demonstrated approaches and technologies. The demonstration program iwas for technologies and methods with completed proof-of-principle work. The impact of the demonstration should have been to reduce the time and cost of gaining ATO for legacy and new facility energy control systems and devices and to validate the energy and cost savings achieved by allowing network connectivity of legacy systems.
1 Type Authorization-An official authorization decision to employ identical copies of an information system or subsystem (including hardware, software, firmware, and/or applications) in specified environments of operation.
2 Reciprocity-Mutual agreement among participating enterprises to accept each other’s security assessments in order to reuse information system resources and/or to accept each other’s assessed security posture in order to share information. Can apply to both TA and non-TA systems.
Funded projects will appear below as project overviews are posted to the website.
Many currently-installed facility energy control systems and devices are not providing their full benefit (operational efficiency or energy and cost savings) to DoD due to restrictions on network connectivity stemming from cybersecurity concerns. Additionally, new facility energy and water technologies increasingly incorporate “smart” components and control systems that rely on network connectivity to send and receive data and control signals. For these technologies to operate as intended and be cost-effective, they must have access to DoD network with minimal additional installation, operation and maintenance costs. Currently, the process to gain ATO, a requirement for network connected systems and devices, can be cost-prohibitive and time consuming, which limits DoD’s ability to benefit from these advanced technologies.
Platform IT (PIT), which is identified in the RMF process, is a category of both IT hardware and software that is physically part of, dedicated to, or essential in real time to the mission performance of special purpose systems. PIT is further categorized as PIT products, PIT subsystems, or PIT systems. PIT differs from “traditional” IT in that it is integral to – and dedicated to the operation of – a specific platform. Although the term PIT is used only by DoD, the concept of categorizing components and systems dedicated to the operation of a specific platform is not.
DoDI 8510.01 provides for a Type Authorization and Reciprocity. The type authorization is used to deploy identical copies of an IS or PIT system in specified environments. This method allows a single security authorization package to be developed for an archetype (common) version of a system. The system can then be deployed to multiple locations with a set of installation, security control and configuration requirements, or operational security needs that will be provided by the hosting Platform Enclave3 . Cybersecurity reciprocity reduces time and resources wasted on redundant test, assessment and documentation efforts and is best achieved through transparency (i.e., making sufficient evidence regarding the security posture of an IS or PIT system available, so that an Authorizing Official (AO) from another organization can use that evidence to make credible, risk-based decisions regarding the acceptance and use of that system or the information it processes, stores, or transmits).
A key challenge for Reciprocity is identifying the risks associated with the services/agencies Platform Enclave (Transport Backbone) and applying equivalent security controls mitigations to ensure the AO from one service will accept the TA from another service with a different PE configuration (e.g. Navy PSNet and AF CELAN). Implementing the DoDIN Joint Information Environment (JIE) should alleviate some of these issues, but the demonstration project should identify common security controls and solutions and gaps or mismatched controls that will need customized responses.
Additional information on the RMF process and related references can be found on the SERDP-ESTCP website.
3 Platform Enclave-Those components of the control system that are standard IT components and can be secured in a standard manner independent of the type of control system. These components serve only the control system and include the IP network, network management and security devices (e.g., switches, routers), software, computers and/or other devices which provide management and security of the network.